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Do Elderly Workers Substitute 
for Younger Workers in the 
United States?
Jonathan Gruber and Kevin Milligan
The Social Security program has been the single biggest social insurance 
program in the United States for decades. It is viewed as a vital piece of the 
nation’s safety net, providing security and well-  being for the elderly. Yet it 
is also a program with a long-  run ﬁ  scal shortfall that soon will be spending 
more than it collects and that by roughly 2050 will have no savings left from 
the existing trust funds to ﬁ  nance that beneﬁ  t shortfall. As a result, there is 
a wide ranging policy discussion over reform to the program. Suggestions 
range from the straightforward (raising the payroll tax that ﬁ  nances the 
program) to the more exotic (private savings accounts to replace the exist-
ing system).
A number of the policy options considered would impact the labor force 
decisions of the elderly, as discussed in Coile and Gruber (2004, 2007). For 
example, Coile and Gruber (2004) estimate that raising both the early and 
normal retirement age by three years would lead to signiﬁ  cantly lower retire-
ment rates, with the odds of participating in the labor force at age sixty-  ﬁ  ve 
rising by as much as 20 percentage points.
One question that is often raised in international discussion is whether 
such an increase in the labor supply of the elderly will lead to a reduction in 
the labor supply of young and prime age workers. A common view expressed 
in the international context is the “lump of labor” view that there are a ﬁ  xed 
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number of jobs, so that if more of those jobs are taken by the nonretiring 
elderly, there will be fewer such jobs for the young. This view is commonly 
disputed by economists, however, who argue that the labor market is not a 
ﬁ  xed box but is rather a dynamic market that can adapt to large changes in 
labor supply. In the U.S. context, this view appears to dominate, as there has 
been little discussion of the “crowding out” of the young by older workers.
In this paper, we investigate the extent of such “crowding out” in the 
United States over time. We begin by documenting time series trends in labor 
supply by age group. We then turn to a more formal regression analysis of 
those trends. Finally, we develop a measure of the variation over time in the 
incentives for retirement of the elderly and relate that to the labor supply 
of both the elderly and younger workers. Overall, our data suggest little 
substitution across these groups.
12.1    Background
12.1.1      Institutional Features of Social Security
As this paper focuses on labor supply responses to Social Security reform, 
a brief overview of the Social Security program is necessary to understand 
how the program aﬀects retirement; see Diamond and Gruber (1998) for 
a more detailed review. An individual is entitled to retired worker beneﬁ  ts 
once he or she has worked forty quarters in covered employment. Beneﬁ  ts 
are calculated in several steps. Annual earnings are indexed by an average 
wage index, and the thirty- ﬁ  ve highest years of earnings are used to compute 
the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME).1 A progressive formula is 
applied to the AIME to obtain the primary insurance amount (PIA). Finally, 
the PIA is adjusted to obtain the monthly beneﬁ  t amount based on when 
beneﬁ  ts are ﬁ  rst received. Individuals claiming at the normal retirement 
age (NRA, legislated to grow slowly from sixty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  seven) receive 
the PIA. Individuals can receive beneﬁ  ts as early as age sixty-  two (the early 
retirement age, or ERA) or can delay until age seventy. Beneﬁ  ts are reduced 
by 6.67 percent for each year of receipt prior to the NRA and are increased 
by a delayed retirement credit of 3 percent to 8 percent for each year receipt 
is postponed past the NRA, depending on the worker’s birth year.2 Beneﬁ  t 
receipt is subject to an earnings test before age sixty-  ﬁ  ve, whereby earnings 
above a ﬂ  oor amount reduce beneﬁ  ts currently and cause them instead to 
be paid out (with an actuarial adjustment) upon full retirement. Spouses 
of beneﬁ  ciaries also receive a dependent beneﬁ  t equal to 50 percent of the 
1. Earnings after age sixty are in nominal dollars, increasing the incentive to work at these 
ages.
2. The delayed retirement credit (DRC) is rising from 3 percent for workers born prior to 1925 
to 8 percent for workers born after 1942. For workers with an NRA above sixty-  ﬁ  ve, beneﬁ  ts 
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worker’s PIA or a survivor beneﬁ  t equal to 100 percent of the worker’s PIA 
although the spouse receives only the larger of this and his or her own retired 
worker beneﬁ  t. Beneﬁ  ts are funded with a payroll tax of 12.4 percent, paid 
half by employers and half by employees.
Additional work aﬀects Social Security wealth in several ways. First, the 
additional year of earnings may replace an earlier year of zero or low earn-
ings in the AIME calculation, raising the monthly beneﬁ  t. Second, work 
beyond age sixty-  two implies a delay in claiming beneﬁ  ts (if earnings are 
signiﬁ  cantly above the earnings test ﬂ  oor). Beneﬁ  ts are foregone for a year, 
but future beneﬁ  ts are higher due to the actuarial adjustment. Finally, addi-
tional work results in additional payroll taxes. The combination of these 
three eﬀects determines whether the Social Security system provides a return 
to additional work that is more or less than actuarially fair.
12.1.2      Concerns over “Crowding Out” of Labor Supply of Young
The United States has really had only two major reforms of its Social 
Security system over the past thirty years. The ﬁ  rst was the “Greenspan 
Commission” in 1983, called in to solve an impending ﬁ  scal crisis for the 
program. Part of the Commission’s recommendations, which were adopted 
into law, was extending the “normal retirement age” from age sixty-  ﬁ  ve to 
age sixty-  seven over a period of many years. As Coile and Gruber (2007) 
estimate, such a reform has a relatively modest impact on retirement deci-
sions because the actuarially fair U.S. system makes incentives roughly 
neutral around retirement ages. Perhaps as a result, there is no evidence of 
a signiﬁ  cant discussion about the labor market consequences of this bill 
for the nonelderly. A detailed literature search found only one article from 
this entire era addressing the issue. Hicks (1977, 33) writes “Increasing the 
retirement age may cost the unemployed as many as 150,000 to 200,000 jobs 
a year, plus delaying the promotions of those already working.”
The second major reform was the removal of the “earnings test” for 
Social Security after age sixty- ﬁ  ve, which was legislated in 2000. Once again 
there was little discussion of possible substitution of the labor supply of the 
elderly for that of the young. Smith (2003) titled her article “Senior Citi-
zens Are among Teenagers’ Job Competition,” but the article itself contains 
little discussion of this point. Congressman Jim Bunning, in announcing 
a hearing on the future of Social Security, did say about options to raise 
the retirement age, “But retirement income might be lower for those who 
cannot work longer due to employers continuing to provide incentives for 
older workers to retire and make room for younger workers” (Committee 
on Ways and Means 1998).
This is only a very modest set of comments on an issue that is a major 
source of discussion in other nations. Somehow, the “lump of labor” view 
does not appear to have taken hold in a meaningful way in the United 
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12.2    Time  Series  Trends
Our analysis of the labor market impacts of changing elderly labor force 
participation uses data from the nation’s largest annual labor market sur-
vey, the Current Population Survey (CPS). We use data from the annual 
March supplement to the CPS, for most years from 1962 through 2007.3 This 
supplement includes detailed questions about labor force participation that 
are fairly constant over time. We divide our sample into three age groups: 
those twenty to twenty-  four (the “young”), those twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four 
(“prime age”), and those ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four (the “elderly”). We examine 
several variables of interest: labor force participation (LFP), employment, 
and unemployment. We take averages of these measures for each age group 
over time using the provided survey weights. The analysis is presented in 
each case ﬁ  rst for both sexes pooled together, then for males and females 
separately.
Time series comparisons of the trends across age groups are shown in 
panel A of ﬁ  gure 12.1. The labor force participation (LFP) of the elderly 
displays a gentle U-  shaped pattern, dropping until the late 1980s before 
rising through to 2007. The LFP of the young is rising through time, likely 
because of increasing participation by females. Finally, the unemployment 
rate of the young hits its highest points in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
when elderly LFP is at its lowest. This does not appear consistent with the 
crowd- out  hypothesis.
We break this analysis down by sex in panels B and C of ﬁ  gure 12.1. The 
LFP of young males is fairly constant at around 80 percent over the entire 
span. Participation by elderly men rebounds only slightly in the late 1990s 
and does not reach the levels seen in the 1960s. In contrast, the LFP of both 
young and older women increases over the time period studied here. For 
younger women, the increase is concentrated in the ﬁ  rst two decades of the 
sample up to the mid- 1980s. In contrast, the LFP of the elderly women does 
not begin to rise until the mid-  1990s, when it rises substantially. Finally, 
the cyclicality of male youth unemployment appears to exceed that of 
females.
Panel A of ﬁ  gure 12.2 displays the LFP of the elderly against the unem-
ployment rate for the young and the prime-  aged. The most noticeable pat-
tern here is the cyclicality of the unemployment rate for the youth, which is 
mirrored in a muted way for the prime-  aged. Panels B and C of ﬁ  gure 12.2 
for males and females demonstrate again that males and younger individu-
als show more cyclicality. However, nowhere here is there any evidence of 
crowd out. When unemployment is at its highest in the early 1980s, elderly 
LFP is near its lowest.
Finally, panel A of ﬁ  gure 12.3 shows the employment rates of the youth 
3. We are missing data from 1963, 1965, 1970, 1976, and 1994.Fig. 12.1    Evolution of elderly labor force participation for elderly and the young: 
A, Both sexes; B, Males; C, Females
A
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CFig. 12.2    Elderly labor force participation versus unemployment for the young and 






Fig. 12.3    Elderly labor force participation versus employment for the young and 
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and prime- aged against the LFP of the elderly. The employment rates trend 
upward over this time period. The breakdown by sex reveals in panel B of ﬁ  g-
ure 12.3 that male employment rates do not trend (but are cyclical) and that 
there is a very strong upward trend for both youth and prime-  aged female 
employment. Nowhere, however, is there sign of any crowd-  out eﬀect.
To summarize the graphical analysis, we ﬁ  nd gentle U-  shaped trends in 
the LFP of the elderly, but the labor market behavior of the youth and 
prime- aged is best described as cyclical for the males, and as following a secu-
lar upward trend for the females. The cyclicality and secular trend appear to 
be much stronger than any crowd-  out eﬀect.
12.3    “Direct”  Crowding-  Out  Regressions
In this section, we formalize the graphical analysis of Section 12.2 by run-
ning time series regressions of the labor supply of the young and prime age 
on that of the elderly. We estimate time series regressions of the form:
Yt  0  1 ELDERLYEMPt  Xt2  et.
For both the young and the prime age groups, we use unemployment rate and 
the employment rate as dependent variables (Yt). The key independent vari-
able in each regression is the rate of elderly employment (ELDERLYEMPt). 
The additional control variables (Xt) that we use in some speciﬁ  cations 
include the level of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and the growth 
rate of GDP per capita.
We employ four diﬀerent speciﬁ  cations, in common with the other coun-
tries in this project. Each of these four is repeated ﬁ  rst without any extra 
control variables and then with the extra Xt control variables. For the ﬁ  rst 
speciﬁ  cation, we use the simple levels of elderly employment and the depen-
dent variables. Next, we lag elderly employment by three years in order to 
try to avoid the impact of any contemporary shock aﬀecting both sides of 
the equation. Third, we take the ﬁ  fth diﬀerence of all the variables in the 
equation. Finally, we log both elderly employment and the dependent vari-
able and take the ﬁ  ve-  year log diﬀerence.
Table 12.1 displays the results for men and women pooled together. Each 
cell reports the coeﬃcient on elderly employment from a separate regression. 
Looking at unemployment rates in the ﬁ  rst column, we expect an increase in 
elderly employment to increase youth unemployment if there is crowd out. 
However, the coeﬃcients down the column are strongly negative. The –0.402 
coeﬃcient in the ﬁ  rst row can be interpreted as follows: a 1 point increase in 
the elderly employment rate is predicted to decrease youth unemployment by 
0.402 points. The coeﬃcients, with one exception, are statistically signiﬁ  cant. 
This evidence is against the crowd-  out hypothesis.
The second column has the results for youth employment. Here, we expect 
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Without controls in the top panel, three of four coeﬃcients fail to attain sta-
tistical signiﬁ  cance, but all are negative. In the bottom panel, with controls, 
all four coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁ  cant at conventional levels, and all 
are negative. This suggests that more elderly employment leads to a decrease 
in youth employment, which is consistent with crowd out. Moreover, the 
coeﬃcients are large. For example, with controls, the ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerence 
speciﬁ  cation yields a coeﬃcient of –0.875, which is the predicted drop in the 
youth employment rate with a 1 point increase in the elderly employment 
rate. This is somewhat confusing because the unemployment rate and the 
employment rate are moving in the same direction. This is possible, though, 
if there is a large increase in labor force exits. However, these estimates might 
be tainted by the secular trend increase in female employment through this 
period. We will check this further in the male-  only results that follow.
The third and fourth columns of the table investigate the impact of elderly 
employment on the labor market behavior of the prime-  aged twenty-  ﬁ  ve to   
ﬁ  fty-  four-  year-  olds. The same pattern emerges as for the youth—negative 
impacts for the unemployment rate and the employment rate across all speci-
ﬁ  cations, with most attaining statistical signiﬁ  cance.
Table 12.1  Direct regressions of labor market crowdout: both sexes
Youth Prime
    UE   EMP   UE   EMP
No controls
Levels –0.402 –0.297 –0.258 –0.136
(0.065) (0.174) (0.040) (0.237)
3-  year lag on elderly employment –0.224 –0.507 –0.192 –0.488
(0.097) (0.138) (0.058) (0.221)
5- year  diﬀerence –0.486 –0.105 –0.337 –0.110
(0.127) (0.240) (0.084) (0.157)
5-  year log diﬀerence –4.062 –0.065 –5.189 –0.078
(1.025) (0.206) (1.126) (0.118)
With controls
Levels –0.415 –0.468 –0.277 –0.439
(0.066) (0.098) (0.038) (0.067)
3-  year lag on elderly employment –0.223 –0.545 –0.195 –0.558
(0.098) (0.094) (0.059) (0.055)
5- year  diﬀerence –0.104 –0.875 –0.065 –0.539
(0.119) (0.213) (0.069) (0.162)
5-  year log diﬀerence
 
–3.192 –0.246 –3.991 –0.163
  (1.137)   (0.138)   (0.776)   (0.088)
Notes: Reported in each cell is the coeﬃcient on elderly employment in separate regressions 
with the dependent variable listed in the column headings. The standard error is beneath each 
estimate in parentheses. The diﬀerent speciﬁ  cations appear in each row of the table. The 
speciﬁ  cations are explained in the main text. UE  the share of the population unemployed; 
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To check on the impact of the diﬀerent trends experienced by males and 
females over this forty-  ﬁ  ve-  year time period, we break out the results for 
males only in table 12.2. The results for the unemployment rates are the same 
in direction as was seen in table 12.1. The magnitudes are sometimes higher 
and sometimes lower, and statistical signiﬁ  cance fails in some cases. How-
ever, for the males, the message is clear that the youth and the prime-  aged 
unemployment rates drop when elderly employment increases. In contrast 
to the pooled sex results, the impact on youth is mixed and for prime-  aged 
employment is strongly positive. For the youth, two positive estimates attain 
statistical signiﬁ  cance at the 10 percent level, and there is one signiﬁ  cant 
negative result. The rest are not statistically signiﬁ  cant. For the prime- aged, 
seven of the eight are positive and statistically signiﬁ  cant. The diﬀerence 
between these results and table 12.1 may be driven by the increasing female 
employment rates through time that contrast with the downward trend in 
elderly employment over this period. When just males are used, this eﬀect 
is absent.
12.4    Incentive  Regressions
In this section, we explore the use of an index capturing the incentive for 
elderly workers to retire. By using this index, we hope to use variation in the 
Table 12.2  Direct regressions of labor market crowdout: males only
Youth Prime
    UE   EMP   UE   EMP
No controls
Levels –0.182 0.197 –0.141 0.369
(0.055) (0.058) (0.031) (0.028)
3-  year lag on elderly employment –0.024 0.070 –0.072 0.275
(0.073) (0.072) (0.043) (0.044)
5- year  diﬀerence –0.597 0.382 –0.400 0.417
(0.151) (0.218) (0.095) (0.101)
5-  year log diﬀerence –4.913 0.378 –6.214 0.328
(1.327) (0.211) (1.386) (0.081)
With controls
Levels –0.415 0.150 –0.277 0.323
(0.063) (0.088) (0.035) (0.041)
3-  year lag on elderly employment –0.260 –0.051 –0.222 0.238
(0.101) (0.111) (0.058) (0.069)
5- year  diﬀerence –0.072 –0.403 –0.054 0.009
(0.143) (0.216) (0.085) (0.082)
5-  year log diﬀerence  –3.498 0.157 –4.236 0.227
(1.438)   (0.206)   (1.018)   (0.055)
Note: See table 12.1 notes.Do Elderly Workers Substitute for Younger Workers in the United States?    3 5 5
work behavior of the elderly that is related to policy changes rather than 
potentially endogenous economic shocks that might aﬀect all parts of the 
economy. The index, described in more detail in the appendix, attempts to 
encapsulate in one number for each year in the data set the overall incentives 
faced on average by elderly labor market participants. This may be a some-
what diﬃcult task to undertake because the time series variation in beneﬁ  ts 
is not large—as discussed earlier, the reforms of the system have been few, 
especially compared with many European countries.
A graph of the index values against elderly employment rates appears in 
ﬁ  gure 12.4. The Ibar line represents the full index, capturing both the wealth 
and dynamic incentive eﬀects. The Wbar line shows the average value of 
Social Security Wealth among those still in the labor force. (Again, more 
details are in the appendix.) There are no sharp jumps in Wbar through time, 
so the growth in Wbar reﬂ  ects wage growth across cohorts and through time. 
The sharp increase in Ibar after 1971 reﬂ  ects the inﬂ  uence of the well- known 
“notch” in Social Security beneﬁ  ts. The impact of the notch lives on into 
the 1980s in this calculation because we average over the incentives faced by 
active labor market participants, and the “notch generation” was still active 
into the mid-  1980s.
How should the index results be interpreted? When the index increases, it 
should decrease the labor force participation of the elderly. This means that 
we expect to see negative coeﬃcients for the employment of the elderly when 
regressed on this measure. Following through, if there is less employment 
among the elderly, a positive coeﬃcient among the youth or prime-  aged 
would indicate that there is evidence of crowding out.
Table 12.3 begins the analysis, using the same eight speciﬁ  cations as in the 
direct analysis in tables 12.1 and 12.2. The top panel shows results without 
Fig. 12.4    Elderly employment rate, I (y) and W (y)356        Jonathan Gruber and Kevin Milligan
additional controls, and the bottom panel shows similar results from speci-
ﬁ  cations with control variables. The ﬁ  rst two columns contain the results for 
the impact of the index on the elderly. The results, mostly, are statistically 
insigniﬁ  cant. The ﬁ  ve-  year log diﬀerence speciﬁ  cation does show statisti-
cal signiﬁ  cance in the expected direction, with higher unemployment and 
lower employment indicated in years with higher values for the retirement 
incentive index.
A scatter plot of the ﬁ  fth diﬀerence of the Ibar index and the elderly 
employment rate appears in ﬁ  gure 12.5. In this scatter plot, there is no clear 
relationship between the two variables. This may explain the lack of consis-
tent ﬁ  ndings in the ﬁ  rst two columns of table 12.3.
For youth and prime- aged individuals, the results in table 12.3 are mixed. 
The youth columns show two statistically signiﬁ  cant negative results for 
unemployment and two positive results for employment. If there were crowd 
out, this is the direction we would expect these coeﬃcients to go. For the 
prime-  aged, there is one positive coeﬃcient for unemployment and several 
Table 12.3  Impact of retirement incentives on the employment of the elderly, prime-  aged, and 
young: both sexes
Elderly Youth Prime
    UE   EMP   UE   EMP   UE   EMP
No controls
Levels 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.024 0.002 0.045
(0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
3-  year lag on elderly 
employment
–0.001 0.015 –0.006 0.022 –0.001 0.043
(0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005)
5- year  diﬀerence 0.000 –0.007 –0.016 –0.003 –0.002 0.013
(0.004) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016) (0.007) (0.010)
5-  year log diﬀerence 0.100 –0.025 0.047 –0.004 0.114 0.011
(0.103) (0.010) (0.071) (0.015) (0.095) (0.008)
With controls
Levels 0.005 –0.027 –0.005 0.004 0.008 0.026
(0.003) (0.018) (0.010) (0.014) (0.006) (0.010)
3-  year lag on elderly 
employment
0.000 0.029 –0.032 –0.012 –0.011 0.005
(0.003) (0.018) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007) (0.012)
5- year  diﬀerence 0.001 –0.009 –0.014 –0.004 0.001 0.014
(0.003) (0.010) (0.006) (0.015) (0.004) (0.010)
5-  year log diﬀerence 0.217 –0.064 0.069 0.015 0.191 0.025
(0.094)   (0.015)   (0.087)   (0.017)   (0.092)   (0.010)
Notes: Reported in each cell is the coeﬃcient on the retirement incentive index in separate regressions 
with the dependent variable listed in the column headings. The standard error is beneath each estimate 
in parentheses. The diﬀerent speciﬁ  cations appear in each row of the table. The speciﬁ  cations are ex-
plained in the main text. UE  the share of the population unemployed; EMP  the share of the popu-
lation in work.Do Elderly Workers Substitute for Younger Workers in the United States?    3 5 7
positive coeﬃcients for employment. The stronger results for prime-  aged 
employment are consistent with the idea of crowd out—higher retirement 
incentives for the elderly appear to be related to more employment by the 
prime- aged.
For these results, the caveat discussed earlier about the long-  run upward 
trend of female employment again becomes important. For this reason, 
we again investigate the results just for men in table 12.4. In the ﬁ  rst two 
columns for the elderly, the results are mildly stronger than the pooled men 
and women results, with several statistically signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  ndings. The positive 
relationship between the incentive index and unemployment—and the nega-
tive relationship of the index with employment—indicates that the incentive 
index is somewhat predictive of the labor market behavior of the elderly.
The results for the youth and the prime- aged, however, show no consistent 
pattern. There are a few statistically signiﬁ  cant results across the table, but 
the signs are not clearly in one direction or the other. For example, the sec-
ond row with the three-  year lag on elderly employment shows a signiﬁ  cant 
–0.015 drop for a one unit increase in the index. However, when controls 
are introduced in the sixth row of the table, the coeﬃcient is now negative 
and signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level. The overall impression of this table, 
however, is of no statistically signiﬁ  cant relationship between the incentive 
index and the employment of young and prime-  aged men.
Fig. 12.5    Elderly employment rate and I (y) index in ﬁ  fth diﬀerences358        Jonathan Gruber and Kevin Milligan
12.5    Conclusions
In this chapter, we have investigated the impact of elderly employment on 
the youth and prime- aged labor markets. In the “direct” regressions, we ﬁ  nd 
some evidence that movements in elderly employment are negatively related 
to prime- aged employment. However, our males- only evidence suggests that 
these ﬁ  ndings may be tainted by the inclusion of women, who experienced 
a large secular increase in employment over this period. Using the incentive 
index, we ﬁ  nd little evidence of crowd out. But our incentive index is not 
strongly predictive of the labor market behavior of the elderly, so this may 
reﬂ  ect more on the diﬃculty of exploiting the available policy variation in 
a time series study.
Our conclusion, therefore, is relatively weak. We ﬁ  nd no consistent evi-
dence of an impact of the employment of the elderly on the young or 
prime-  aged in our sample. This evidence for one country alone may not be 
conclusive. However, when placed in the context of the other countries in 
this project, it is possible that stronger conclusions may be drawn—again 
highlighting the potential power of the multicountry analysis.
Table 12.4  Impact of retirement incentives on the employment of the elderly, prime-  aged, and 
young: males only
Elderly Youth Prime
    UE   EMP   UE   EMP   UE   EMP
No controls
Levels –0.001 –0.048 –0.002 –0.010 0.002 –0.019
(0.001) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
3-  year lag on elderly 
employment
–0.002 –0.037 –0.010 –0.006 –0.002 –0.015
(0.001) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
5- year  diﬀerence 0.002 –0.008 –0.022 0.020 –0.002 0.007
(0.006) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.010) (0.010)
5-  year log diﬀerence 0.147 –0.028 0.057 –0.006 0.130 –0.005
(0.102) (0.009) (0.088) (0.014) (0.112) (0.006)
With controls
Levels 0.008 –0.041 –0.003 0.006 0.012 –0.008
(0.004) (0.023) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010)
3-  year lag on elderly 
employment
0.001 0.033 –0.039 0.021 –0.012 0.019
(0.005) (0.025) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010)
5- year  diﬀerence 0.004 –0.012 –0.017 0.015 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005)
5-  year log diﬀerence
 
0.306 –0.061 0.087 0.015 0.264 –0.005
  (0.110)   (0.016)   (0.098)   (0.021)   (0.099)   (0.007)
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Appendix
Incentive Index Construction
Please note that this discussion is drawn from the Canadian chapter because 
the construction of the index followed very similar methodology and com-
puter programs.
The goal of the exercise is to arrive at a single incentive number for each 
calendar year to be used in the time series regressions. We begin with a 
proﬁ  le of median earnings for a central cohort. This earnings proﬁ  le is then 
shifted for inﬂ  ation forward and backward to generate equivalent real wage 
proﬁ  les for all birth cohorts. This method ensures that the only diﬀerence in 
incentive measures across years will be in changes in beneﬁ  t formulas and 
not cross-  cohort diﬀerences in wages.
These cohort age-  earnings proﬁ  les are next pushed through a detailed 
calculator for Social Security beneﬁ  ts. At each age from ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-
  nine, we calculate the capitalized value of future beneﬁ  ts (Social Security 
Wealth, or SSW) and also the “peak value” concept found in Coile and 
Gruber (2004, 2007). The peak value represents the diﬀerence between cur-
rent SSW and its highest value in the future, given current information for 
a forward-  looking individual.
To collapse this down to an annual time series, we start by recognizing that 
an individual viewed at age a has faced retirement incentives at age a, a – 1, 
a – 2, . . . back to the ﬁ  rst age of eligibility. We, therefore, average the incen-
tives within a cohort across ages (from the current age back to age ﬁ  fty- ﬁ  ve), 
using the aggregate age- year- sex speciﬁ  c labor force participation as weights. 
We generate the age-  year-  sex labor force participation rates from the CPS. 
Because this survey only goes back to 1962 and is also missing some years, 
we ﬁ  ll in missing years and extrapolate backward using an assumption of 
constant age-  sex labor force participation rates. This calculation gives us 
an average exposure to retirement incentives for each cohort in each year 
of interest.
The ﬁ  nal step involves collapsing the average incentive measures to a single 
number for each year. This means we must average the incentive measures 
faced by each cohort in a given year. To do this, we weight by the proportion 
of the population represented by each age in a given year.
To enrich the measurement of incentives, we assign a weight to the SSW 
component and the peak value component. We determined these weights 
using an iterative technique, ﬁ  nding weights that maximized the ﬁ  t of a 
regression of elderly LFP on the incentive measure.
The foregoing can be expressed mathematically as follows. The incentive 
measure I at age a and year y can be expressed as:
I(a, y)  {W(a, y)  [W(a, y)  PV∗(a, y)]},360        Jonathan Gruber and Kevin Milligan
where W(a, y) is the SSW at age a and year y, PV∗(a, y) is the peak value of 
SSW, and  and  are the weighting parameters for the wealth level and peak 
value diﬀerence, respectively. These I(a, y) terms are then summed across 
all previous ages, within cohort:
I (a, y) 
   
P(a,y)×
I(a,y)⋅LFP(a −t,y −t −1)
t=0
a−55 ∑

































where LFP(a – t, y – t – 1) is the labor force participation rate for a member 
of the cohort in a previous year. The extra minus 1 accounts for the fact 
that we want the labor force participation rate at the beginning of the year, 
not during the year. Finally, we average across all cohorts in a particular 
year, where P(a, y) is the population of the cohort in a given year. This I (y) 
term is the incentives index used for the regressions appearing in tables 12.3 
and 12.4.
We also make use of W (y), which is calculated by substituting the SSW 
of the individual at age a and year y, W(a, y), in for I(a, y). This W (y) term 
calculates the average pension wealth across individuals in a given year.
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